004.832 — Решение задач

A Unified Framework for Uniform-Price Resource Allocation Mechanisms Ioannis Caragiannis, Dimitris Fotakis, Stratis Skoulakis · 2026

Learning to Contest: Decentralized Robust Fairness in Cooperative MARL via Cross-Attention Can Savcı · 2026

Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier · 2010

The Power of Altruism in Sticker Economics: Generosity Minimizes Collective Costs and Overprotective Norms Fuel Inefficiency Luana Ferraz Alvarenga, Caetano Alvarenga Costa, César Rennó-Costa · 2026

Arbitrage-free Data Pricing Yihang Wu, Zhengyu Jin, Yicheng Fu, Jinfei Liu, Kui Ren · 2026

Trading Utility for Dynamic Fairness in Multiple Resource Division with Sequential Demand Kaiqi Jiang, Karim El Husseini, Wenzhe Fan, Xinhua Zhang · 2026

Equilibrium Computation in Extensive-Form Games with Stochastic Action Sets Thomas Schwarz, Ryann Sim, Chun Kai Ling · 2026

EconCSLib: AI-Assisted Lean Formalization for Economics & Computation research Nikhil Garg · 2026

Price Elasticity of Gas Demand on L1 and L2: Evidence from Ethereum and Arbitrum Pranay Anchuri, Akaki Mamageishvili · 2026

No, Cake Cutting Really is a Piece of Cake Stephen Arndt, Benjamin Moseley, Sungjin Im, Kirk Pruhs · 2026

N-Player Binary Games with Unidirectional Dependencies: Cycle Robustness and Induced Indifference Jose Maria Sanchez-Saez, Nana Odishelidze, Francisco Criado-Aldeanueva · 2026

Competing Auctions in Intermediated Markets Bruno Mazorra, Minghao Pan, Christoph Schlegel · 2026

Welfare Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Improved Approximation Guarantees Beyond the Fixed Price Barrier Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel Shaulker · 2026

Mean-based algorithms: A lower bound and regret Julius Durmann, Amelie Kleber · 2026

Fairness and Strategy-Proofness in Automated Market Makers Frank M. V. Feys · 2026

Mechanism Design (New Developments) Steven N. Durlauf, Lawrence E. Blume · 2010

Metric Facility Assignment with Partial Information Vasilis Gkatzelis, Hasti Karimi, Emma Rewinski, Maziar Shamsipour, Alexandros A. Voudouris · 2026

Revenue Guarantees of No-Swap-Regret Dynamics in First Price Auctions Anders Bo Ipsen, Stratis Skoulakis · 2026

Regret Minimization in Single-Dimensional Contract-Design with Binary Actions Riccardo Poiani, Martino Bernasconi, Andrea Celli · 2026

Competitive Information Design in Sequential Search Zhicheng Du, Hu Fu, Ying Qin, Zihe Wang · 2026

Causal Mirage Equilibrium in Agentic Machine Intelligence Hamidou Tembine · 2026

Adverse Effects of V2V Adoption on Road Safety Zhenqi Liu, Philip N. Brown, Keith Paarporn · 2026

Entanglement in the Quantum Volunteer's Dilemma Noah Dane Hebdon, Dax Enshan Koh · 2026

Revenue-Maximizing Auctions · 2016

Coherent Swap Regret and Channel-Proof Learning Sohail Sarkar · 2026

Online Min-Cost Matching with General Arrivals Josh Ascher, Eric Balkanski, Jason Chatzitheodorou, Vasilis Gkatzelis · 2026

Exploring cooperation mechanisms via reinforcement learning in network common-pool resource games Yihang Qin, Lin Wang · 2026

Improved Lower Bounds for Proportionally Fair Clustering Benjamin Cookson, Eva Deltl, Yeeseok Oh · 2026

Evidence Markets Safwan Hossain, Gabriel Andrade, Chengqi Zang, Yiling Chen · 2026

Modelling Opinion Dynamics at Scale with Deep MARL Lukas Seier, Brandon Kaplowitz, Sebastian Towers, Richard Bailey, Jakob Foerster · 2026

Pluralistic Leaderboards Nika Haghtalab, Ariel D. Procaccia, Han Shao, Serena Lutong Wang, Kunhe Yang · 2026

Algorithmic Game Theory · 2008

Algorithmic Mechanism Design, 1999; Nisan, Ronen · 2024

Constant Approximation for Hylland--Zeckhauser Equilibria Yonglei Yan, Zhengyang Liu · 2026

Simultaneous EF1 and approximate MMS allocations for submodular valuations Uriel Feige, Assaf Fine · 2026

DNQ: Deep Nash Q-Network for Partially Observable n-Player Games Qintong Xie, Edward Koh, Xavier Cadet, Peter Chin · 2026

A Unified Variational Design of Predictive Mirror Descent in Convex Games under Stochastic Feedback Yunian Pan, Tao Li, Quanyan Zhu · 2026

Accelerating Min-Max Optimization via Power-Law Stepsizes Yue Wu, Weiqiang Zheng, Yang Cai, Haipeng Luo · 2026

The Price of Decentralization in Block Building Burak Öz, Fei Wu, Luis Correia, Sen Yang, Bruno Mazorra, Stefanos Leonardos · 2026

Improved Amenability Bounds for Local Coordination Games Ron Peretz, Dean Kraizberg · 2026

Learning to cooperate with emergent reputation via multi-agent reinforcement learning Xinwei Song, Yizhe Huang, Dengji Zhao, Xue Feng · 2026

Episodic Memory Temporal Consistency for Cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Zicheng Zhao, Yu Lan, Chengzhengxu Li, Zhaohan Zhang, Xiaoming Liu · 2026

Improved Approximation Guarantees for Groupwise Maximin Share Fairness Georgios Amanatidis, Anna Korfiati, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios · 2026

Extending the El Farol Bar Game with Partial Observability and Incentive Design Iosif Polenakis, Kalliopi Kastampolidou, Theodore Andronikos · 2026

Learning to Bid in FCR Markets: A Best-of-Both-Worlds Approach Marius Potfer, Cheng Wan, Pierre Gruet · 2026

The Representation-Rationalizability Tradeoff in Reward Learning Jing Dong, Yaoliang Yu, Pascal Pourpart · 2026

From Talking Words to Sharing Thoughts: Scalable Multi-LLM Aggregation via Structured Message Passing Niloufar Mehrabi, Sayed Pedram Haeri Boroujeni, Abolfazl Razi · 2026

Algorithms and Complexity of Influence Maximization on Directed Acyclic Graphs Panfeng Liu, Biaoshuai Tao · 2026

Hardness of Approximate Hylland-Zeckhauser Equilibria Mark Braverman, Jingyi Liu, Eric Xue, Chenghan Zhou · 2026

Repeated Descent: A Framework for Online Budget-Feasible Auctions Andreas Charalampopoulos, Dimitris Fotakis, Thanos Tolias · 2026

Fairness in two-player zero-sum games with bandit feedback S Akash, Pratik Gajane · 2026

Differing Roles of Leisure and Productivity in GDP - A Machine Learning based comparative analysis of Germany and USA Achintya Ranjan, Uma Ranjan · 2026

Introspection Dynamics with Mutation in Additive Games Harry Foster, Vincent A. Knight, Sebastian Krapohl · 2026

A Generalized Nash Equilibrium-Seeking Scheme for Trauma Resuscitation Promise Ekpo, Angelique Taylor, Lekan Molu · 2026

Imperfect Commitment in Maximal Extractable Value Auctions Aleksei Adadurov, Sergey Barseghyan, Anton Chtepine, Antero Eloranta, Andrei Sebyakin, Arsenii Valitov · 2026

Distributionally Robust Games via Coherent Risk Measures Bharat Gangwani, Arunesh Sinha · 2026

PrefBench: Evaluating Zero-Shot LLM Agents in Hidden-Preference Personalized Pricing Negotiations Yingjie Lei · 2026

Competitive Search with a Faulty Satnav (GPS): When Probability Matching is Rational Steve Alpern, Mark Broom · 2026

Coalition Free Energy and Adaptive Precision in Multi-Agent Cooperation Djamel Bouchaffra, Faycal Ykhlef, Mustapha Lebbah, Hanane Azzag · 2026

Envy Cycle Elimination with Strategic Agents: Best Responses and Fairness Guarantees Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser · 2026

God numbers for Graphs, Games and Groups Z. Adams, M. Z. Cassim, C. Hou, O. Knill, V. Seco Roopnaraine, M. H. Saleem · 2026

Learning Empirical Evidence Equilibria under Weak Environmental Coupling Aya Hamed, Jason R. Marden, Jeff S. Shamma · 2026

Greater Flexibility in Mechanism Design Through Altruism Ruben Brokkelkamp, Sjir Hoeijmakers, Guido Schäfer · 2022

PeerBTS: Incentivizing Effort in Strategyproof Peer Selection Harper Lyon, Omer Lev, Nicholas Mattei · 2026

Analyzing the Effects of Two-Stage Peer Evaluation Roy Fairstein, Harper Lyon, Oshri Damty, Omer Lev, Nicholas Mattei, Kobi Gal · 2026

Cloud Computing Review: A Decade of Research Smruti Rekha Swain · 2026

Reinforcement Learning for Reachability: Guaranteeing Asymptotic Optimality Amogh Palasamudram, Jakub Svoboda, Suguman Bansal, Krishnendu Chatterjee · 2026

Multi-Dimensional Matching in Market Design Irene Aldridge · 2026

Best-Case and Strong Nash Equilibria · 2016

An Exact Cooperation Formula for Introspection Dynamics in the Heterogeneous Public Goods Game Harry Foster, Vincent A. Knight, Sebastian Krapohl · 2026

Super Condorcet Winners and Limit Coalitional Manipulability of IRV François Durand, Élie de Panafieu, Guillem Perarnau · 2026

Approximate Mechanism Design for Distributed Facility Location Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris · 2021

Efficient Elicitation of Collective Disagreements Mohamed Ouaguenouni, Felipe Garrido-Lucero, Umberto Grandi, César Hidalgo, Magdalena Tydrichova · 2026

The Privacy Subsidy in Glosten-Milgrom: Bid-Ask Spread and Welfare under Flip-Noise Direction Observation Yuki Nakamura · 2026

Strange bifurcation diagrams Jakub Bielawski, Thiparat Chotibut, Fryderyk Falniowski, Michał Misiurewicz, Georgios Piliouras · 2026

Perpetual Fully-Online Approximate Fairness Ido Kahana, Erel Segal-Halevi, Noam Hazon · 2026

Smoothed Elicitation Complexity for Approximate $Γ$-calibration of Discrete Classification Tasks Jessica Finocchiaro, Victor Ganson, Drona Khurana · 2026

GENSTRAT: Toward a Science of Strategic Reasoning in Large Language Models Vartan Shadarevian, Kia Ghods, Alex Kenich, Anany Kotawala · 2026

Prudent-Banker: No Extra Fees for Baseline Safety in Adversarial Bandits With and Without Delays Ting Hu, Luanda Cai, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis · 2026

ИСКУССТВЕННЫЙ ИНТЕЛЛЕКТ В РЕШЕНИИ ЗАДАЧ КИБЕРБЕЗОПАСНОСТИ Кечеджиев А. С., Цветкова О. Л. · 2023

О НЕКОТОРЫХ СПОСОБАХ РЕШЕНИЯ ЗАДАЧ С ПАРАМЕТРАМИ Соатов У. А., Джанизоков У. А. · 2023

Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin · 2007

The Privacy Subsidy in Continuous-Time Kyle: Cumulative Welfare under Noise-Perturbed Order-Flow Observation Yuki Nakamura · 2026

The Behavioral Credibility Trilemma: When Calibrated Autonomy Becomes Impossible Lauri Lovén, Nam Do, Hassan Mehmood, Dinesh Kumar Sah, Sasu Tarkoma · 2026

Proof of Useful Attestation: A Consensus Primitive for Attestation-Native Chains Stefan Stefanović · 2026

The Impact of Competition on Outcomes of Score-Based College Admissions George Bentley, Diptangshu Sen, Juba Ziani · 2026

Real-Time Parallel Counterfactual Regret Minimization Boning Li, Longbo Huang · 2026

Equilibria in Multiplayer Graph Games: An Algorithmic Study Léonard Brice · 2026

A Nash Equilibrium Framework For Training-Free Multimodal Step Verification Rohit Sinha, Kunal Tilaganji, Tanuja Ganu, Nagarajan Natarajan, Amit Sharma, Vineeth N. Balasubramanian · 2026

Smooth Partial Lotteries for Stable Randomized Selection Alexander Goldberg, Giulia Fanti, Nihar B. Shah · 2026

Convergence of Stochastic First-Order Algorithms in Bertrand Competition Under Incomplete Information Martin Bichler, Jan-Sebastian Hoehener · 2026

On the Complexity of Correlated Equilibria Beyond Normal-Form Games Ioannis Anagnostides, Constantinos Daskalakis, Gabriele Farina, Noah Golowich, Tuomas Sandholm, Brian Hu Zhang · 2026

Social mechanism design Roger A. McCain · 2015

Mechanism Design Steven N. Durlauf, Lawrence E. Blume · 2010

Algorithmic Mechanism Design Noam Nisan · 2015

Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Schapira, Scott Shenker · 2007

Algorithmic game theory and the computation of market equilibria Benton John McCune · 2024

The Privacy Subsidy: Kyle's $λ$ under Noise-Perturbed Order-Flow Observation Yuki Nakamura · 2026

Do Not Trust The Auctioneer: Learning to Bid in Feedback-Manipulated Auctions Luigi Foscari, Matilde Tullii, Vianney Perchet · 2026

Multi-Winner Voting Games in TU and NTU: When is the Core Always Non-Empty? Jiehua Chen, Christian Hatschka · 2026

Imperfect Commitment in Maximal Extractable Value Auctions Aleksei Adadurov, Sergey Barseghyan, Anton Chtepine, Antero Eloranta, Andrei Sebyakin, Arsenii Valitov · 2026

The fitness landscape of social norms in social dilemmas Maximilian Puelma Touzel · 2026

TERMS-Bench: Diagnosing LLM Negotiation Agents Beyond Deal Rate Erica Zhang, Fangzhao Zhang, Aneesh Pappu, Batu El, Jose Blanchet, Susan Athey, Jiashuo Liu, James Zou · 2026

Correlated optimin Mehmet Mars Seven · 2026

GAE Falls Short in Imperfect-Information Self-Play Reinforcement Learning Zhiyuan Fan, Gabriele Farina · 2026

Distributionally Robust Games via Coherent Risk Measures Bharat Gangwani, Arunesh Sinha · 2026

Prompt Mechanism for Ad Placement over Time Yossi Azar, Ety Khaitsin · 2011

Other Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Theory · 2014

Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists) Noam Nisan · 2007

Mechanism Design without Money James Schummer, Rakesh V. Vohra · 2007

Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design · 2016

Watermarking Game-Playing Agents in Perfect-Information Extensive-Form Games Juho Kim, Fei Fang, Tuomas Sandholm · 2026

Data-Augmented Game Starts for Accelerating Self-Play Exploration in Imperfect Information Games JB Lanier, Nathan Monette, Pierre Baldi, Roy Fox · 2026

When Individually Calibrated Models Become Collectively Miscalibrated Zhaohui Wang · 2026

Temporal Fair Division in Multi-Agent Systems: From Precise Alternation Metrics to Scalable Coordination Proxies Nikolaos Al. Papadopoulos · 2026

Mechanism Design for Locating a Facility Under Partial Information Vijay Menon, Kate Larson · 2019

Mechanism Design and Agency Theory · 2007

Selfish Load Balancing Berthold Vöcking · 2007

Beyond the briscola advantage: a Monte Carlo dominance test for deterministic strategies in two-player Briscola Game Piero Giacomelli · 2026

Probabilistic Mechanism Design in Diffusion Auctions Xinlun Zhang, Zhechen Li, Yongzhi Cao, Yu Huang, Hanpin Wang · 2026

An Almost Ideal Coordination Mechanism for Unrelated Machine Scheduling Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli · 2016

Correction to: Algorithmic Game Theory Dimitris Fotakis, Evangelos Markakis · 2019

Introduction to Noncooperative Game Theory: Games in Normal Form · 2008

Routing Games Tim Roughgarden · 2007

Computational Game Theory Bruno Codenotti · 2011

Auction Design with a Revenue Target Paul W. Goldberg, Bo Tang · 2015

The Co-evolution of Costly Signaling and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas Mahdi Abolhasani, Saman Moghimi-Araghi, Mohammad Salahshour · 2026

Heuristic Pathologies and Further Variance Reduction via Uncertainty Propagation in the AIVAT Family of Techniques Juho Kim, Tuomas Sandholm · 2026

Parallelizing Counterfactual Regret Minimization Juho Kim, Tuomas Sandholm · 2026

Over-Provisioning and Atomic Selfish Routing · 2016

Algorithmic game theory applied to networks and populations Simon Collet · 2024

Artificial Intelligence, Game Theory and Mechanism Design in Politics Tshilidzi Marwala · 2023

Learning Empirical Evidence Equilibria under Weak Environmental Coupling Aya Hamed, Jason R. Marden, Jeff S. Shamma · 2026

A Tractable Class of Cooperative Games Defined by Directed Networks: Unanimity Decomposition and Shapley Value David Ryzák, Tomáš Kroupa · 2026

Toward an Origin of Human Randomness: Interaction-Driven Enhancement in the Rock-Paper-Scissors Game Song-Ju Kim, Shoma Ohara, Hiroaki Kurokawa · 2026

Mechanism Design for Connecting Regions Under Disruptions Hau Chan, Jianan Lin, Zining Qin, Chenhao Wang · 2026

ЭТАПЫ РЕШЕНИЯ ЗАДАЧИ ЭЛЕКТРИЧЕСКИХ ЦЕПЕЙ Байрамов Г., Аннагурбанов А., Гурбанова Н. · 2023

ПОЗНАВАТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ РЕШЕНИЯ ЗАДАЧИ КАК СПОСОБ РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ МЕТОДИКИ АДАПТИВНОГО ОБУЧЕНИЯ МАТЕМАТИКЕ Костюченко Роман Юрьевич · 2024

Решение задачи оптимизации рыбодобывающей деятельности Лисиенко Светлана Владимировна, Иванко Нина Сергеевна · 2023

ТЕХНОЛОГИИ РЕШЕНИЯ ЗАДАЧ КОМПЬЮТЕРИЗИРОВАННОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ Аннамаммедова О. А., Оразова Дж Б. · 2023

Myerson's Lemma · 2016

Game theory and mechanism design for cooperative competition dilemmas between healthcare providers Brendan Michael Bettinger · 2024

Mechanism design and income distribution Weiying Zhang · 2017

Key Notions in Game Theory · 2014

Auction theory and mechanism design · 2011

Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre, Xiaomeng Zhang · 2019

Online Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design with Predictions Georgios Amanatidis, Evangelos Markakis, Christodoulos Santorinaios, Guido Schäfer, Panagiotis Tsamopoulos, Artem Tsikiridis · 2025

Equilibria: Definitions, Examples, and Existence · 2016

Conclusion Tshilidzi Marwala · 2023

Approximate Envy-Free Allocations up to any $k$ Goods Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Georgios Kalantzis, Fangxiao Wang · 2026

DelAC: A Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning of Team-Symmetric Stochastic Games Duan-Shin Lee, Yu-Hsiu Hung · 2026

Regret Minimization in Bilateral Trade With Perturbed Markets Anna Lunghi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi · 2026

A Theory of Multilevel Interactive Equilibrium in NeuroAI Zhe Sage Chen, Quanyan Zhu · 2026

Game Theory and Mechanism Design Y Narahari · 2013

Modular Game Engine Design Aaron Boudreaux, Brandon Primeaux · 2024

Swap Regret and the Minimax Theorem · 2016

Capacitated Network Design Games Michal Feldman, Tom Ron · 2012

Introduction and Examples · 2016

Algorithmic Mechanism Design · 2008

Algorithmic Game Theory and Scheduling · 2007

Hints to Selected Exercises and Problems · 2016

Distributed management of competitive access to common resources using algorithmic game theory Ρέμους-Άρης Κουτσιαμάνης · 2024

Combinatorial Auctions Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan · 2007

Risk Robust Mechanism Design for a Prospect Theoretic Buyer Siqi Liu, J. Benjamin Miller, Alexandros Psomas · 2019

Cost Sharing Kamal Jain, Mohammad Mahdian · 2007

Kidney Exchange and Stable Matching · 2016

Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversary Simone Di Gregorio, Paul Dütting, Federico Fusco, Chris Schwiegelshohn · 2026

The End Justifies the Mean: A Linear Ranking Rule for Proportional Sequential Decisions Carmel Baharav, Niclas Boehmer, Bailey Flanigan, Maximilian T. Wittmann · 2026

Dynamic Transaction Scheduling and Pricing in the Ethereum Mempool Fatemeh Fardno, S. Rasoul Etesami · 2026

Offline Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games with KL Regularization Claire Chen, Yuheng Zhang, Xinyu Liu, Zixuan Xie, Shuze Daniel Liu, Nan Jiang · 2026

Sharp Spectral Thresholds for Logit Fixed Points Tongxi Wang · 2026

The Privacy Subsidy: Kyle's $λ$ under Noise-Perturbed Order-Flow Observation Yuki Nakamura · 2026

An Enriched Model of Strategic Voting under Uncertainty Henri Surugue, Sébastien Destercke · 2026

Misspecified Explore-then-Exploit Leads to Supra-Competitive Prices Jackie Baek, Vivek F. Farias, Farrell Wu · 2026

Cryptography and Game Theory Yevgeniy Dodis, Tal Rabin · 2007

Mechanism Design in Politics Tshilidzi Marwala · 2023

Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions Giannis Fikioris, Dimitris Fotakis · 2020

Approximate Strategyproofness in Approval-based Budget Division Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Jeremy Vollen · 2026

Position Auctions with a Capacity Constraint Eleni Batziou, Georgios Birmpas, Georgios Chionas, Piotr Krysta · 2026

Bayesian Persuasion with a Risk-Conscious Receiver Yujing Chen · 2026

Sure-almost-sure and Sure-limit-sure Window Mean Payoff in Markov Decision Processes Pranshu Gaba, Shibashis Guha · 2026

Essays on Game Theory, Mechanism Design, and Financial Economics Thomas Rivera · 2024

Game Theory in Politics Tshilidzi Marwala · 2023

On the Planner’s Loss Due to Lack of Information in Bayesian Mechanism Design José R. Correa, Nicolás Figueroa · 2009

The Price of Anarchy and the Design of Scalable Resource Allocation Mechanisms Ramesh Johari · 2007

No-Regret Dynamics · 2016

Best-Response Dynamics · 2016

Further Topics in Mechanism Design · 2014

Graphical Games Michael Kearns · 2007

Algorithmic Mechanism Design · 2016

Mechanism Design Basics · 2016

Mechanism Design with Payment Constraints 113 · 2016